A number of experimental studies have not provided consistent support for any of the negotiating models. While some participants achieved similar results to those of the models, others did not, but focused on simple conceptual solutions that were beneficial to both parties. The Nash balance was the most common match (mode), but the average (average) agreement was closer to a point based on the expected benefits.  In actual negotiations, participants often first seek a general negotiating formula, then elaborate only the details of such an agreement, which excludes the point of contention and shifts the focus to the worst possible agreement. The displaystyle disagreement point is the value that players can expect if negotiations fail. This could be a central balance that both players could expect. However, this point has a direct impact on the negotiated solution, so it is obvious that each player should try to choose his point of opinion in order to maximize his negotiating position. To achieve this goal, it is often advantageous to increase your disagreement while impairing the opponent`s disagreement (hence the interpretation of disagreement as a threat). If threats are considered actions, you can build a separate game in which each player chooses a threat and receives a payment based on the outcome of the negotiations. It is known as Nash`s variable threat game. Strategies are represented by a pair (x, y) in Nash`s request game.
x and are selected from the interval [d, z], hence the result is disagreement and z the total of the property. If x-y is equal to or less than z, the first player receives x and the second y. Otherwise, both receive d; often d `0`displaystyle d`0`. Nash (1953) presents an uncooperative application game with two players who are unsure of the payment pairs that are achievable. Within the border, when uncertainty disappears, balance payments converge on those predicted by Nash`s negotiated solution.  Some economists have studied the impact of risk aversion on the negotiated solution.